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Abstract
This paper examines the determinants of “echoing” in antidumping (AD) cases (i.e.,
diﬀerent countries sequentially imposing AD measures on the same product from the
same exporter). We develop a dynamic game in which two competing importers can
choose to impose an AD duty on a third exporting country in one of two periods, if
at all. Assuming that governments are politically motivated (favoring their import-
competing industries), we find that a country imposes an AD duty in the first (second)
period independently of the other country’s actions if its political-economy parameter
is “very high” (“high”). Instead, it never introduces AD measures when its political-
economy parameter is below a critical “low” threshold. Echoing occurs for intermediate
values of the political-economy parameter: a country chooses to impose an AD duty in
the second period if and only if the competing importer has done so in the first period.
Using a novel AD dataset, we document that echoing is a common practice among
both traditional and new users of AD. In line with the conclusions of the theoretical
model, the econometric results show that AD measures are more likely to be introduced
in response to other countries’ measures when governments care to some extent, but
not too much, about their import-competing industries. Thus, this paper shows that
countries’ political-economy-driven trade policies are interdependent and should not be
analyzed in isolation.
Keywords: Antidumping; political economy of trade protection.
JEL classification: F12, F13, F14.
∗The authors would like to thank Gisele Braun for excellent research assistance. The authors would also
like to thank Mostafa Beshkar, Eric Bond, James Lake, Kristy Buzard, and participants at the Asian Meeting
of the Econometric Society, the ETSG Conference, the Midwest International Trade Conference, and the KDI
School research seminar for very helpful comments and suggestions. Maurizio Zanardi gratefully acknowl-
edges financial support from the GRASP collaborative project funded by the European Commission’s Seventh
Framework Programme for Research (Contract no. 244725).
Contact information: Chrysostomos Tabakis: KDI School of Public Policy and Management, 85 Hoegiro Dong-
daemun Gu, Seoul 130—722, South Korea. E-mail: ctabakis@kdischool.ac.kr; Maurizio Zanardi: Lancaster Uni-
versity Management School, Bailrigg, Lancaster LA1 4YX, United Kingdom. E-mail: m.zanardi@lancaster.ac.uk
1 Introduction
With the worldwide decrease in applied tariﬀ rates and the strengthening of countries’ trade
commitments with the World Trade Organization (WTO), other forms of trade policies have
become more important. Antidumping (AD) is among the most widely and commonly used
instruments to grant trade protection. Its stated objective is to eliminate the injurious eﬀects
of dumping (i.e., exporting at less than fair value). However, the discretionary application in
practice of AD measures makes AD “simply another form of protection” (Blonigen and Prusa,
2003), which is regularly used by a large number of developed and developing countries.
The nature of AD, and in particular its discriminatory application among countries and
among exporting firms within a country, has given rise to a long literature that has examined
its strategic eﬀects, as well as its eﬀects on trade flows. As is also the case with other trade
instruments, it has been shown that the introduction of AD measures responds to political
pressures, despite the fact that the rhetoric behind AD is that it simply addresses cases of
unfair competition (i.e., dumping). The survey by Blonigen and Prusa (2003) provides a
detailed overview of the AD system and of the various eﬀects that AD can give rise to.
From an empirical perspective, the most astonishing fact is that the set of countries that
currently use AD on a regular basis has become much larger in the last two decades. While only
a handful of developed countries used AD before the 1990s, developing countries such as Brazil,
China, and India began using AD in the late 1990s and are nowadays among its most active
users, targeting both developed and developing countries in their AD investigations. Moreover,
a casual look at the data reveals that the same products exported by the same country are
systematically subject to ADmeasures in multiple importing countries at the same time. Maur
(1998) was the first to detect several such occurrences between Canada, the European Union
(EU), and the US. He defined “antidumping cases targeting in diﬀerent importing countries
similar products originating in the same exporting country” as AD echoing. Some anecdotal
evidence (e.g., announcements in the popular press; Bown, 2009) suggests that echoing may
still be a relevant feature of global AD use, and this paper aims at analyzing its occurrence
and determinants by pursuing three main objectives.
The first objective of this paper is to verify the relevance of AD echoing and provide a
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quantification of its extent. We have assembled worldwide AD data for the period 1980—
2005 and identified echoing by matching cases from diﬀerent importing countries based on
the classification of the products under investigation and the timing of the AD measures.
This data-intensive process shows that AD echoing is indeed still quite common and involves
many cases from the new users of AD. All the cases of echoing identified in our novel dataset
are listed in Table 1. Clearly, there are many occurrences of echoing and they are quite
heterogenous. They could involve just two importing countries, as in the case of pneumatic
tires for bicycles exported by China and subject to AD measures in Argentina and Turkey in
2003. But they can also involve several importing countries, as in the case of synthetic staple
fibers exported by South Korea and targeted with AD measures in six importing countries in
the early 2000s.1 The “length” of Table 1 makes clear that echoing is a much more widespread
phenomenon than originally highlighted by Maur (1998), and is certainly not relevant only
for developed countries. More details and summary statistics (by countries and sectors) of
echoing are presented in Section 4, but we can quantify its overall extent by noting that 20.5%
of all AD petitions in our sample that were concluded with the imposition of measures are
involved in echoing.
Having established that echoing is an empirically relevant phenomenon, the second ob-
jective of this paper is to provide a simple model to explain its occurrence. To this end, we
develop a four-period, two-stage dynamic game in which two competing importers can en-
dogenously choose to impose an AD duty on a third exporting country in one of two periods,
if at all. Firms compete in quantities, and face an increasing marginal cost of production
and segmented markets. Furthermore, in line with the empirical literature on AD, we assume
that governments are politically motivated (favoring their import-competing industries). The
prediction of our model is intuitive but not necessarily obvious. We find that if a country’s
political-economy parameter exceeds a critical “very high” threshold, it then chooses to im-
pose an AD duty in the first period independently of the other country’s actions. If the
parameter in question is not “very high” but is still suﬃciently “high,” it only does so in the
second period. On the other hand, if its political-economy parameter is below a critical “low”
threshold, the country never imposes a duty since the associated costs outweigh the expected
1At most 11 importing countries are part of an echoing case in our sample.
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political (and terms-of-trade) gains. Finally, for intermediate values of the political-economy
parameter, we observe echoing: a country chooses to impose a duty in the second period if
and only if the competing importer has done so in the first period.
The third objective of this paper is to provide an econometric analysis of echoing to shed
some light on its determinants. The analysis is motivated by our theoretical model, which
suggests that the AD measures of a country aﬀect other countries’ decision to impose AD
measures only for intermediate values of the political-economy parameter, since a country
would independently introduce such measures if it cared a lot about its import-competing
industries. The analysis is based on the 15 most active users of AD, which together account
for over 90% of the total number of AD petitions in our sample period. The level of the analysis
is quite disaggregated, as we look at the probability that an importing country imposes AD
measures against exports from a given trading partner in any of the 4-digit Harmonized System
(HS) categories. The key variable of interest is the interaction between the AD actions taken
by other countries and the country-specific political-economy parameter, which is proxied by
the sectoral use of AD in each country. Using diﬀerent samples and alternative formulations
of the political-economy parameter, the results are robust and confirm that echoing occurs
as a result of other countries’ AD measures when the government of an importing country
cares enough, but not too much, about its import-competing industries. To sum up, the
theoretical model and the empirical analysis show that the political-economy channels that
lead to certain policy actions should be viewed as part of an interdependent decision process
across countries. Thus, countries’ trade policies should not be analyzed individually but jointly
in order to explicitly take into account their feedback eﬀects.
Our paper contributes to the literature analyzing the country-level reactions induced by
the introduction of AD measures.2 Various empirical papers have documented the extent (if
any) of trade diversion due to AD, whereby imports of goods subject to AD decrease from
the target country but increase from other sources. Prusa (1997) finds substantial trade-
diversion eﬀects for US AD measures, while Konings et al. (2001) find no such eﬀect for a
sample of EU AD cases.3 Similarly, Ganguli (2008) and Park (2009) document significant
2There is also a (short) literature on how individual firms react to the introduction of AD measures (see
footnote 8 for some references).
3However, Brenton (2001) does find evidence of trade-diversion eﬀects in the case of EU AD measures.
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AD trade-diversion eﬀects for India and China, respectively. Along these lines, Bown and
Crowley (2007) is the paper closest in spirit to our analysis. They find clear evidence of
significant distortions in trade flows as a result of AD, as Japanese exports targeted by US
AD measures are rerouted to third countries (i.e., trade deflection takes place), while Japanese
exports decrease to third countries targeted by US AD actions (i.e., trade depression occurs).
Although Bown and Crowley (2007) look at reactions of trade flows to AD restrictions, they
do not consider the sequential imposition of measures on a given product exported by a given
country.
In terms of the theoretical model, our approach is clearly inspired by Farrell and Saloner
(1985) who develop a two-period incomplete-information model in which two users choose to
either stick to an old technology or adopt a new one. Furthermore, our work is at a broad level
influenced by the extensive literature on endogenous sequencing (or not) of firm quantity or
pricing decisions. For instance, Hamilton and Slutsky (1990) consider a two-period quantity
game with perfect and complete information, Robson (1990) looks at a price-setting duopoly,
Mailath (1993) examines a quantity-setting duopoly game with asymmetrically informed firms,
and Daughety and Reinganum (1994) employ a two-period homogeneous-good duopoly model
wherein information can be acquired by agents.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a brief overview of
AD practices. The theoretical model and its equilibrium characterization appear in Section
3, while the data and the empirical analysis are presented in Section 4. Section 5 concludes.
2 Features of Antidumping Practices
Dumping has a long history in international trade as demonstrated by Viner (1923) in the
chapter on “The Prevalence of Dumping Prior to 1890” in his seminal contribution on dump-
ing. Instead, the history of AD, as a way to oﬀset the eﬀects of dumping, starts in the 20th
century, with Canada being the first country to adopt an AD law in 1904. From the very
beginning, the use of AD was motivated by the unfairness of dumping strategies. The same
motivation justifies the use of AD, as an exception to the principle of non-discrimination,
within the General Agreement on Tariﬀs and Trade (GATT)/WTO.
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Moving to more recent times, it is a well-known fact that AD policies are not anymore
used only by a few industrialized countries as it was in the 1980s when Australia, Canada, the
EU, New Zealand, and the US (i.e., the so-called traditional users) were the major, if not only,
users of this policy instrument. Nowadays, countries such as Argentina, Brazil, China, and
India, to name just a few, top the rankings of AD use as published by the WTO. Overall, more
than 40 countries have used AD in the last two decades with many more countries having a
dormant AD law.4
Despite the large and heterogeneous group of countries applying AD measures, the general
practices of these policies are fairly similar across countries since they have to adhere to the
Antidumping Agreement of the WTO, which is automatically binding for all WTO member
countries.5 The motivation for the use of AD measures comes from Article VI of GATT 1994
which “recognize[s] that dumping, by which products of one country are introduced into the
commerce of another country at less than the normal value of the products, is to be condemned
if it causes or threatens material injury to an established industry ... or materially retards the
establishment of a domestic industry.” In just a few lines, this article provides a definition of
dumping (i.e., selling at less than fair value, which can occur when exporting at a price below
cost or below the price in the home market) and lays out the necessary conditions for the use
of AD (i.e., dumping and (threatened) material injury due to dumping).
In practice, an AD case begins when a domestic industry petitions its government for the
introduction of AD measures against firms from specific foreign countries. If such a petition
is accepted (i.e., it fulfills all the requirements), an investigation is carried out to verify the
existence of dumping and material injury. While in most countries one governmental agency
is in charge of verifying both, in some countries (e.g., China, US) two diﬀerent authorities
investigate the existence of dumping and of material injury. The investigation develops into
a preliminary and final stage, and should be concluded within one year (except in special cir-
cumstances when the investigation may last up to 18 months). AD measures can be imposed
as soon as aﬃrmative preliminary findings are reached, while the investigations are concluded
4See, among others, Zanardi (2004) for an account of the worldwide growing use of AD. See, also, Vanden-
bussche and Zanardi (2008) for an empirical analysis of the determinants of the adoption and first use of AD
laws.
5WTO member countries are not obliged to have an AD law, but if they do have one, it has to be consistent
with the agreement in question, which, in any case, leaves some flexibility for its implementation.
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at the preliminary stage in case of negative findings of dumping and/or injury.6 If the investi-
gation continues to the final stage, an aﬃrmative decision will lead to the imposition of final
measures lasting maximum five years, except if extended (always by sequences of maximum
five years) through reviews because of evidence of continuing dumping and injury.7 AD mea-
sures can take diﬀerent forms: ad valorem or specific duties, or price undertakings by which
foreign exporters commit to stop dumping. In either case, the measures are not only country-
but also firm-specific (and within a country some firms may also be found not guilty and be
exonerated from any measure). Thus, ADmeasures are an exception to the non-discrimination
principle of the WTO since they are applied only against some countries and to a diﬀerent
degree among exporters of a given good (or goods) from a given country. Once measures are
in place, they can be reviewed at the request of interested parties for possible adjustments.8
Similarly, reviews are conducted if an interested party requests the extension of the measures
past their initial validity period.
3 The Model
We now develop a simple model in order to provide a theoretical explanation for the occurrence
of AD echoing. More specifically, we present a four-period, two-stage game in which two
competing importers can choose to impose an AD duty on a third exporting country in one of
two periods, if at all. The first stage is the “AD initiation stage,” where the former decide on
whether to initiate an AD case against the latter and if so, in which of two periods. The second
stage is the “AD implementation stage,” where the AD duties are optimally determined in
accordance with the stage-1 decisions. Markets are segmented and firms compete in quantities.
The governments’ choice to introduce AD measures is partly determined by their desire to
maximize national welfare; however, policymakers are politically motivated, attaching an extra
weight to the profits of their domestic import-competing industry in the objective function
they seek to maximize.
6An investigation can also be terminated at the request of the filing industry.
7See Moore (2006) and Cadot et al. (2007) for an analysis of the length of AD measures and the eﬀect of
the WTO provisions introduced in 1995 on the mandatory five-year reviews.
8DeVault (1996), Blonigen and Park (2004), Reynolds and Gourlay (2012), and Nita and Zanardi (2013)
look at the changes in the level of (US and EU) AD duties during the period they are in force.
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3.1 Consumption and Production
We assume the world consists of three countries, , , and . There exists one firm in
each country, which produces a single good for domestic consumption and for export. Let us
index both countries and firms by  or  ∈ {} so that the output produced by firm
 for consumption in country  is denoted by  . Markets are segmented and firms compete
in quantities à la Cournot. The production technology is identical across countries and is
characterized by increasing marginal cost. In particular, the total cost of production for firm
 is given by:
 () = 
2
2
, (1)
where  =
X

 is firm ’s total output (i.e., the sum of firm ’s domestic sales and exports
to the two foreign markets). From equation (1), we have that ∀  0, ( () ) =   0
and (2 () 2 ) = 1.
On the consumption side, inverse demand in all countries is of the linear form:
 ¡¢ = − , (2)
where  and  are positive constants, and  =X

 is the total output sold in country ,
(i.e.,  equals the sum of sales in country  by domestic firm  and by the two foreign firms).
Firm ’s aggregate profit from sales in all three markets equals:
 =
X

£ ¡¢  −   ¤−  () , (3)
where   ,  6= , denotes country ’s specific AD duty on imports from country , and   is equal
to zero. It is immediate to show that
¡2 −¢ = −  0, where − ∈ {} \ {},
meaning that there is (strict) strategic substitutability between the diﬀerent firms’ choice
variables. Each firm chooses three quantities, and setting ( ) = 0 for  ∈ {},
we obtain the following three equations for firm :
 =
− X
−
− −   −
X
−
−
2 + 1 , (4)
where − ∈ {}\{}. The solution to the system of the nine first-order conditions (i.e.,
three for each firm) provides us with the Cournot Nash equilibrium quantities sold by each
firm in each market.
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Notice that because the marginal cost of production is increasing, each firm’s output
choices across markets are interdependent. This implies that if there is any change in the
trade barriers faced by a firm in any of the markets, the firm will readjust its Cournot Nash
equilibrium quantities in all markets.
3.2 Antidumping Decisions
Governments decide on the introduction of AD measures partly with the objective of maxi-
mizing national welfare. However, they are politically motivated, attaching an extra weight
to the domestic firm’s profit in their objective function. More specifically, the objectives of
country ’s government are represented by:
  =
Z 
 ()
 ( )  +  +
X
−
¡ −− −−¢ , (5)
where  ≥ 1 is a political-economy parameter capturing the degree of political motivation
of country ’s government, and − ≥ 0 is the (fixed) cost for country  associated with
the imposition of an AD duty on imports from country −.9 We maintain the assumptions
that countries’ political-economy parameters are (i) private information; and (ii) a priori
independently drawn from the uniform distribution on
£ ¤, with  ≥ 1, and this is common
knowledge.
In order to keep our analysis as simple as possible, we consider the case where only countries
 and  have the ability to introduce AD duties and only against exports from country . In
particular, in what follows we assume that (i) country  has no AD legislation in place; and
(ii) ,  are prohibitively high, implying that (in equilibrium)  =  = 0. Furthermore,
we impose symmetry in the AD cost:  =  ≡ e.
The countries face a two-stage, four-period horizon, with each stage consisting of two
periods, as illustrated in Figure 1. Stage 1 is the “AD initiation stage.” More specifically, in
this first two-period stage, each of countries  and  has the option of initiating an AD case
against country  in period 1 or period 2 or not at all. Stage 2 is the “AD implementation
stage.” In particular, should an AD case be initiated in either period of stage 1, then the level
9Notice that − = 0 if and only if  − = 0.
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of the AD duty is optimally determined in the corresponding period of stage 2. For instance,
if countries  and  both choose to initiate an AD case against  in the second period of
stage 1, then they simultaneously pick their AD duty in the second period of stage 2. Markets
clear and payoﬀs are realized at the end of stage 2.
Our two-stage, four-period game structure can be justified on two grounds. First, it is
realistic as an AD investigation takes time to be concluded. Second, it considerably simplifies
our analysis, especially with regard to the characterization of the optimal AD duties.
3.3 Equilibrium
In order to shed some light on the occurrence of AD echoing, we look for a symmetric perfect
Bayesian equilibrium for this game, in which:10
(a) For  ∈ {} and − ∈ {} \ {}, (i) if country ’s political-economy parameter
 ≤  ≤ , then country  initiates an AD case against country  in the first period
of stage 1; (ii) if  ≤   , country  initiates an AD case against country  in
the second period of stage 1; (iii) if  ≤   , then country  initiates an AD case
against country  in the second period of stage 1 if and only if country − has done so
in the first period of stage 1; and (iv) if  ≤   , country  never initiates an AD
case against country , where the critical values , , and  are common for both
countries  and .
(b) If, in accordance with equilibrium condition (a), country  initiates an AD case against
country  in either period of stage 1, the AD duty level it selects in the corresponding
period of stage 2 is optimal given the beliefs of countries  and , at that point in the
game, about each other’s political-economy parameter.
(c) The aforementioned beliefs are obtained from the equilibrium strategies of countries 
and  and from their observed actions using Bayes’ rule.
10Notice that if e were equal to zero (i.e., if AD were costless), countries  and  would always choose
to impose AD measures against  even for  = 1 due to terms-of-trade considerations (as these are “large”
countries).
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As summarized in Figure 2, this equilibrium defines three critical values that divide the
interval
£ ¤ in four parts. It is intuitive to understand that, ceteris paribus, higher values of
the political-economy parameter  will result in AD measures being introduced independently
of the competing importer’s actions (i.e., for  ≥ ). However, AD echoing occurs for
intermediate values of the parameter space, when the political motivation is not strong enough
for independent action, but the policymaker is still suﬃciently motivated to initiate an AD
case if another country has done so in the previous period. The reason is that in such case,
trade deflection would take place, hurting the domestic firm and thereby, raising the incentive
of the policymaker to provide some protection to the latter.
We now characterize the equilibrium of our two-stage, four-period game. To this end, let
us fix the critical values for country  (such that  ≥       ) and let us
assume that countries  and  behave in equilibrium as described above.
The value of  is such that, in expected terms and given that country  has initiated
an AD case against  in the first period of stage 1, country  is indiﬀerent between never
initiating an AD case against  and initiating one in the second period of stage 1. In the
latter case, country  will act as a Stackelberg follower in the AD duty game with country 
in stage 2. Analytically,  is implicitly defined by:

h

³
   e ¡¢´ | ≥ i− e
=  £ ¡ ¢ | ≥ ¤ , (6)
where is the payoﬀ for country when acting as a Stackelberg follower,
is country’s payoﬀ under the scenario where it does not impose an AD duty on  while coun-
try  does so,  is the expectations operator, and e ¡¢ represents country ’s updated
beliefs about .
The middle critical value, , is obtained by considering the condition such that, given
that neither country has initiated an AD case against  in period 1 of stage 1, country 
is indiﬀerent between initiating a case in the second period of stage 1 and not taking any
AD action in period 2 either. The expected payoﬀs of these two actions depend on whether
country  will initiate an AD case in period 2 (with probability ¡ − ¢  ¡ − ¢,
in which case country  could either be in a Cournot game or receive ) or not (with
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probability
¡ − ¢  ¡ − ¢, in which case country  could be either a monopolist
or in a situation of free trade). The following equation formally states this condition and
implicitly defines :
 − 
 − 
n

h

³
    ¡¢  e ¡¢´ | ≤   i− eo
+
 − 
 − 
h

¡¢− ei
=
 − 
 −  
 £ ¡ ¢ | ≤   ¤
+
 − 
 − 
£ ¡¢¤ , (7)
where  is the payoﬀ for country  in the scenario where countries  and  si-
multaneously pick an AD duty vis-à-vis country ,  is ’s payoﬀ under the
scenario in which it imposes an AD duty on country  while  does not, and 
is the payoﬀ for  under the scenario where neither  nor  imposes an AD duty on .
Finally, the upper critical value, , is the value of  for which country  is indif-
ferent between initiating an AD case in the first and the second period of stage 1. Once
again, the payoﬀ of each action must be calculated in expected terms and for all the possible
actions of country . In particular, country  will initiate an AD case in period 1 with
probability
¡ − ¢  ¡ − ¢, in period 2 with probability ¡ − ¢  ¡ − ¢, while
it will never initiate an AD case with probability
¡ − ¢  ¡ − ¢. Also, with probability¡ − ¢  ¡ − ¢, country  will initiate an AD case in period 2 if and only if country 
does so in the first period. Thus, depending on country ’s behavior and on its own chosen
action, country  may find itself being a Cournot player, a Stackelberg leader, a Stackelberg
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follower, or a monopolist. In other words,  is implicitly defined by the following equation:
 − 
 − 
n

h

³
    ¡¢  e ¡¢´ | ≥ i− eo
+
 − 
 − 
n
 £ ¡    ¡¢¢ | ≤   ¤− eo
+
 − 
 − 
h

¡¢− ei
=
 − 
 − 
n

h

³
   e ¡¢´ | ≥ i− eo
+
 − 
 − 
n

h

³
    ¡¢  e ¡¢´ | ≤   i− eo
+
 − 
 − 
h

¡¢− ei , (8)
where  is ’s payoﬀ when it emerges as a Stackelberg leader in the AD duty game
with country  in stage 2.
Having characterized the equilibrium, the model is too complicated to allow for a closed-
form solution. Thus, in the next subsection, we have to rely on a numerical solution to gain
some further insights.
3.4 Numerical Solution
As we argued above, to derive an equilibrium of the desired class, we need to resort to numerical
analysis.11 In our benchmark scenario, we use the following parameter values:  = 1, e = 001,
 = 1, and  = 6. Using these parameters as well as equations (6)—(8), and exploiting
symmetry between countries  and , we obtain the following equilibrium critical values:
 =  ≡  = 509624,  =  ≡  = 277845, and  =  ≡  = 266092.
We also confirm numerically that it is optimal for countries  and  to behave as described
by our equilibrium conditions (a)—(c).
To intuitively understand our equilibrium, let us focus, without loss of generality, on
country . If country  imposes an AD duty on country , some of the latter’s exports are
diverted away from the former and towards country  (i.e., trade deflection takes place). This
induces  to also impose an AD duty on , incurring the cost e, as long as its government is
11The numerical analysis was carried out using Mathematica (the code is available upon request).
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suﬃciently politically motivated, i.e., as long as  exceeds the critical threshold . Actually,
if country ’s government is characterized by a relatively high degree of political motivation,
then it will choose to initiate an AD case against  independently of what country  does,
in order to oﬀer some trade protection to its domestic firm. This is the case for  ≥ .
Finally, if country ’s political-economy parameter exceeds the critical threshold ,
then country  will choose to initiate the AD case against country  in the first period of
stage 1. In fact, this is true in equilibrium, even though our numerical analysis reveals that,
in the AD duty game with country , ’s expected payoﬀ when playing as a Stackelberg
follower strictly exceeds the one when acting as a Stackelberg leader for all  ∈ [1 6]. To
understand then our finding, notice that in the game in question, if country  initiates the
AD case against  in period 1 of stage 1, then it will most likely be a Stackelberg leader,
whereas if it does so in period 2 of stage 1, it will more likely be a Cournot player rather than
a Stackelberg follower (see equation (8)). Our numerical analysis does also reveal that for
“large” , (i) ’s expected payoﬀ when acting as a Stackelberg leader strictly exceeds the
Cournot one; and (ii) the diﬀerence between ’s expected payoﬀ under being a Stackelberg
follower and the one under being a Stackelberg leader becomes “small.” It then follows that
if country ’s government is characterized by a “very high” degree of political motivation, it
will choose to initiate the AD case against  in period 1.
3.4.1 Comparative Statics
In order to better understand the forces at work in our model, we now engage in some com-
parative statics with respect to the AD-cost parameter e. We first consider the case where
we increase the cost by 5% relative to our benchmark scenario (i.e., we set e = 00105).
Compared with our benchmark equilibrium, the lower and the middle critical values for coun-
tries  and  are higher, whereas the upper one decreases. In particular, in this “high-cost”
equilibrium, we find that  = 495938,  = 292375, and  = 279453.
Intuitively, as the cost of imposing an AD duty increases, both countries  and  are less
inclined to initiate an AD case against , raising both  and . However, the intuition
underlying the finding that  is lower in the “high-cost” equilibrium than in the benchmark
one is more involved, as we have two oﬀsetting forces at play. In particular, our numerical
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analysis reveals that as compared with our benchmark equilibrium, in the “high-cost” scenario
(i) the diﬀerence between the expected Stackelberg leader and Cournot payoﬀs increases for
“large”  ( ∈ {}), inducing the countries to wait until period 2 of stage 1 in order to
initiate their AD case against ; but at the same time, (ii) the diﬀerence between the expected
Stackelberg follower and Stackelberg leader payoﬀs decreases for “large” , inducing the
countries to initiate their AD activity against  in the first period of stage 1. Our numerical
analysis also shows that the latter force is relatively stronger, giving rise to our finding.
We next decrease e by 5% relative to our benchmark scenario (i.e., we set e = 00095).
The resulting equilibrium critical values for  and  are as follows:  = 524502,  =
262426, and  = 252575. Notice that in comparison with our benchmark equilibrium, in the
“low-cost” equilibrium,  and  are both lower, but  is higher. These results mirror the
conclusions reached for the “high-cost” scenario, and the intuition underlying these findings
is analogous to the one analyzed above.
4 Empirical Analysis
The first objective of our empirical analysis is to provide a comprehensive overview of the
occurrence of AD echoing in the world from 1980 until 2005. In this way, we dramatically
extend the work of Maur (1998) who looked only at the AD actions of Canada, the EU, and
the US over the period 1980—1996. The second objective is to conduct an econometric analysis
of the determinants of AD echoing motivated by the conclusions of our theoretical model. To
this end, we focus on the 15 countries whose total caseload makes them active and regular
users of AD, as explained in detail below. Overall, this subset of countries accounts for over
90% of the total number of worldwide AD petitions.
4.1 Data
Data on the worldwide use of AD come mainly from Bown (2007) and are complemented
with data from Moore and Zanardi (2009) for some years and countries (see Table A in the
appendix for details on geographical and time coverage). While the sample does not include
all known cases of AD in the world, it is fair to say that it covers almost all AD cases with
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only small countries (in terms of AD use) excluded.12 Missing data in both sources have
been added, where possible, by searching the publications of investigating authorities and of
the WTO (i.e., semi-annual reports of the Committee on Antidumping Practices, and Trade
Policy Reviews).
For each petition recorded in the dataset, we have information about all the important
dates and decisions of the AD investigation process.13 The product under investigation is
described in detail and classified according to the HS classification (usually with at least
6 digits). In total, the dataset includes 5,415 petitions initiated by 47 countries. A large
majority of these investigations reached the final stage, and 2,790 of all petitions (i.e., 51.5%)
led to the introduction of AD measures, although there is a lot of country-level heterogeneity
in terms of success rates and forms of measures. Table 2 lists all the AD active countries,
both in terms of initiations and actual implementation of AD measures.14 The US and the
EU top both lists but, as already highlighted in the literature, many developing countries are
heavy users of AD protection as it appears in Table 2.
In the econometric analysis, we control for the value and growth of sectoral trade between
a trading country pair. Trade values are extracted from the UN COMTRADE dataset and
are unfortunately available only for a subset of the years in the sample period.
4.2 Overview of Antidumping Echoing
The definition of AD echoing used by Maur (1998) is subjective and, to some extent, data
driven. In particular, he identified echoing by considering product classification, the identity
of importing and exporting firms involved in an investigation, references to previous related
cases found in oﬃcial publications of the investigating authorities, and imposing at the same
time that a subsequent investigation must take place while previous measures are still in force.
For the purposes of this paper, we define AD echoing as the situation where a given product
(identified by the general description and the 6-digit HS codes supplied by the investigating
12Excluded countries (e.g., Russia) were not members of the WTO during the sample period and their AD
activity cannot be traced systematically over the years.
13An AD case refers to a complaint filed by a domestic industry for a specific good imported from possibly
various countries. Administratively, a petition is initiated for each exporting country so that a case may
include several petitions (one per exporting country).
14Countries included in the econometric analysis are in italics.
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authorities15) exported by a given country is simultaneously subject to AD measures in two
or more importing countries and the imposition of such measures took place within 5 years
from each other. We can also define cases of simultaneous imposition of AD measures (i.e.,
occurring in the same period). In this case, the above definition is modified to consider
measures imposed within 6 months from each other.16 Our definition diﬀers from Maur’s
(1998) in some important aspects because of theoretical and practical reasons. In line with
our theoretical model, we focus only on AD measures and not simply on the initiation of
AD petitions. Moreover, we restrict our attention to measures that are echoed within 5 years,
because actions further away from each other are most likely not the result of political pressures
that are the focus of our theoretical model. Finally, on practical grounds, we only rely on
HS codes and product descriptions to characterize goods subject to AD echoing since details
of exporters and import-competing producers are not readily available for the 47 countries
included in the dataset. The number of countries and cases makes it also impossible to even
attempt to read the oﬃcial publications of the investigating authorities.
Considering our benchmark definition of AD echoing, Table 1 reports the 235 echoing cases
identified in our dataset (sorted by HS code).17 An echoing case is defined as the ensemble of
AD measures a targeted country faces on the same product from several importers, where each
new measure comes into eﬀect within 5 years from the previous one.18 For example, the first
row of Table 1 shows that the US imposed AD measures on garlic from China in November
1994, and Canada followed with measures in March 1997. However, polyvinyl chloride (HS
code 390410) from the US has been subject to AD measures in 11 countries (the maximum in
the sample), but still counts as one echoing case. In total, 573 petitions are involved in 235
echoing cases, representing 20.5% of all AD petitions in our sample that were concluded with
the imposition of measures (i.e., 2,790 measures out of 5,415 petitions filed). The “length”
of this list makes clear that echoing is a much more common phenomenon than originally
highlighted by Maur (1998), and is certainly not relevant only for developed countries.
15Although information is sometimes available at the 8-digit level, such codes are not comparable across
countries.
16Notice that we inherently face right censoring since AD measures in force for less than 5 years at the end
of our sample period may be echoed by subsequent measures, which are though not observable.
17If we were to impose a 3-year maximum lag between AD measures, we would identify 195 echoing cases.
18Notice that this definition implies that measures introduced more than 5 years apart from each other and
possibly not simultaneously in force can be part of the same echoing case.
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Figure 3 reports the distribution of the time lag between impositions of echoed AD mea-
sures. The average lag between two subsequent impositions is exactly 21 months (630 days),
but the median is much lower (16 months or 481 days), indicating the presence of a few out-
liers (as shown in Figure 3). Based on the 6-month window discussed above, 21% of the cases
would qualify as simultaneous impositions of AD measures.
Trying to analyze the long list reported in Table 1, Table 3 presents an overview of tar-
geted countries, importing countries, and industrial sectors involved in AD echoing. China is
the most frequently targeted exporting country (25.0%), with South Korea a distant second
(12.7%) out of a total of 43 countries. The list of AD imposing countries is shorter (31 coun-
tries) but it does feature developing countries with significant shares (e.g., Argentina, Mexico,
Turkey). Still, the EU and the US are at the top of the list, being responsible for 16% and
15% of the measures, respectively. And the steel industry (i.e., HS codes 72 and 73) clearly
dominates among industrial sectors with almost 40% of the total, followed by the chemical
industry (i.e., HS codes 28—38) with a 15% share.
Overall, the picture emerging from Table 3 is in line with general descriptions of the AD
phenomenon in terms of its worldwide use, suggesting that echoing is a pervasive aspect of
AD that is not confined to specific (importing and exporting) countries or products. As is the
case for AD in general, the statistics presented above with regard to the countries introducing
AD measures are sensitive to the chosen sample period, since the number of countries using
this policy instrument has grown dramatically in the last two decades. In particular, the share
of echoing measures from the EU and the US has shrunk substantially with new users such
as Argentina, Brazil, China, India, and Turkey becoming ever more important. For example,
traditional users (i.e., Australia, Canada, the EU, New Zealand, and the US) account for
66.7% of the measures involved in echoing until 1995, but only for 37.9% for the years from
1996 until the end of the sample. Instead, China introduced an AD law only in 1997 and is
responsible for more AD measures involved in echoing than Australia in this recent subsample.
This comprehensive overview of AD echoing illustrates the relevance of the phenomenon:
it is much more widespread than originally reported by Maur (1998), and is more generalized
than the “product overlap” observed by Bown (2009) in various AD petitions filed during the
recent economic crisis.
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4.3 Econometric Analysis
Having documented the extent of AD echoing with descriptive statistics, we now turn to an
econometric analysis to shed some light on its determinants. In the spirit of our theoretical
model, we would expect echoing to be more likely to occur when the government of the
importing country cares enough, but not too much, about its import-competing industries. In
fact, if the weight attached by the government to an industry is very high, it will introduce
AD measures irrespective of the AD actions targeting the same product by other importing
countries.
The econometric analysis is based on the countries that have made major and systematic
use of AD during our sample period. Based on Table 2, which reports summary statistics on
initiations and impositions of AD measures, we select the 5 traditional users (i.e., Australia,
Canada, the EU, New Zealand, and the US), and the 10 new users that have been active users
of AD measures: Argentina, Brazil, China, India, Mexico, Peru, South Africa, South Korea,
Taiwan, and Turkey. These countries filed a total of 4,996 petitions, representing 92.3% of
worldwide recorded petitions, that led to the imposition of 2,685 measures (i.e., these countries
have a slightly higher propensity to impose measures than the whole set of countries–53.7%
versus 51.5%). In terms of echoing cases, 469 out of 2,685 petitions with final measures are
involved in echoing (i.e., 17.5%) for a total of 203 cases (i.e., these countries account for over
86% of the worldwide echoing cases reported in Table 1).
The unit of observation for the analysis is the bilateral-sectoral level over time between the
15 importing countries identified as major AD users above and 39 exporting countries (i.e.,
the same 14 importing countries and the 25 countries constituting the EU).19 Our dependent
variable, , takes a value of 1 (and 0 otherwise) if the importing country  introduces
an AD measure against country  in the 4-digit HS sector  in year . Notice that in the
previous section, we defined echoing considering the 6-digit HS industrial classification, while
the econometric analysis is based on a more aggregate industry definition. This change is
motivated by the fact that the occurrence of AD actions is overall a rare event among all the
industrial sectors of an economy (i.e., the dependent variable is equal to 1 in slightly more
than 0.02% of all the observations), and this issue would become even more extreme at a more
19We exclude intra-EU observations and EU as an exporter since we include its individual member states.
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disaggregated level. Moreover, availability of trade data at the 6-digit HS level is even more
limited and would include a much larger occurrence of zero trade flows.
We then estimate the following linear probability model:
 = ×× +  + 1Θ + 2−4 + 3Θ ·−4 + −2 +  (9)
where ×× represents three-way fixed eﬀects (importing country × exporting country ×
year),  is a set of 2-digit-HS-sector fixed eﬀects, Θ is a set of 2-digit-HS-sector- and
country-specific variables capturing the political-economy channel analyzed in our theoretical
model, −4 indicates whether a group of countries  has introduced final AD measures
against country  in sector  within the 5-year period between  and − 4, −2 includes
control variables, and  is the error term. 1, 2, 3, and  are the coeﬃcients to be
estimated.20
In order to proxy for the political-economy weight in the government objective function,
we rely on the actual country- and sector-specific use of AD measures. In particular, we
count the total number of AD measures introduced by each importing country in each of its
2-digit HS sector in the period 1999—2003. A 5-year window should be long enough for the
preferences of the policymaker to be revealed. The choice of the most recent period common
to all importers guarantees that we are excluding the first few years after the introduction
of an AD law when the AD system is not yet well established.21 Denoting this variable ,
our theoretical model suggests that the AD measures introduced by other countries aﬀect
an importing country’s decision to introduce an AD measure only for intermediate values of
. To allow for such a nonlinear eﬀect, we introduce both  and its squared term. In
other words, we introduce Θ = { 2}. Notice that our proxy for the political-economy
channel is country- and (2-digit-HS-) sector-specific, thus allowing us to include the set of
2-digit-HS-sector fixed eﬀects () and importer×exporter×year (××) fixed eﬀects.
The political-economy proxy Θ is interacted with an indicator of AD actions by other
countries. In particular, −4 is equal to 1 (and 0 otherwise) if at least one AD measure
20Considering the large number of fixed eﬀects, a probit or logit estimator would suﬀer from the incidental
parameter problem.
21Among the new users included in the analysis, China is the last one to have introduced an AD law (in
1997). In the robustness subsection, we specifically address the case of China in order to verify that the
results are robust to the choice of a more recent 5-year period (so as to more accurately characterize the
political-economy motivations of its policymakers).
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in the same 4-digit HS sector  has been introduced within the period between  and − 4 by
the group of countries . And considering the systematically diﬀerent AD experience between
traditional and new users, we distinguish whether the AD measure has been introduced by
the former or by the latter (i.e.,  indicates whether the group in question is the set of
traditional or new users).22 Our theoretical model would suggest that the linear term of the
interaction term should have a positive impact on the likelihood of country  introducing an
ADmeasure against country  in sector , while the squared one should present a negative sign.
Notice that the indicator variable −4 in itself can capture other channels, not directly
related to political economy motivations, whereby the actions of one importing country aﬀect
protectionist measures in other countries (e.g., conveying information on dumping behavior
of exporters). Thus, it is important to emphasize that the key regressors for our analysis are
the interaction terms between past use of AD measures and the political-economy proxy (as
motivated by our theoretical model).
The richness of our dataset allows us to use fixed eﬀects to control for any time-bilateral
variation between the trading partners since the unit of analysis is the 4-digit HS sectoral level
with the proxies for the political-economy channel being defined at the 2-digit HS level. In this
way, we account for any bilateral and time-varying determinants of AD measures, including
the role of any macro-level eﬀects.23 However, the benefit of controlling for any bilateral and
time-varying eﬀects, and thus reducing the possibility of omitted variables bias, comes at the
cost of not being able to confirm previous results from the literature on macro channels.
The matrix −2 includes trade data at the disaggregated 4-digit HS level. In particular,
the amount of imports from an exporter (as a share of total imports of a given product) is
known to be a crucial determinant of ADmeasures. In fact, theWTOAntidumping Agreement
clarifies that AD cases should be rejected when imports from a source country represent less
than 3% of total imports of that good. Furthermore, the larger the import market share,
the more likely for an industry to file an AD petition and for the investigating authority to
22The AD measures introduced by an importing country are not included in the construction of −4
used for that country. For example, the actions of the US are not considered in −4 when  refers to
traditional users and the US is the importing country.
23Various studies (see Bown and Crowley, 2013, and references therein) have highlighted the responsiveness
of AD to GDP growth and exchange rate fluctuations, as well as the role of other macro variables (e.g.,
inflation, current account; see Moore and Zanardi, 2011).
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impose measures because of the role of that exporting country. Moreover, the growth rate
of imports may be a relevant determinant of AD measures since it can capture the extent of
trade diversion induced by AD measures in other countries. Considering that an investigation
on average takes one year to reach its final stage, and that the authorities consider the trade
performance in the year before the AD petition is filed, these regressors are lagged by two
periods. Unfortunately, the scarce data availability for the 1980s forces us to drop a large
number of observations whenever these regressors are included in the estimations.
4.3.1 Results
Since the AD experience of traditional and new users is dramatically diﬀerent and there is
evidence (e.g., Vandenbussche and Zanardi, 2010) that the intensity of current AD use has
important implications for further AD use, we present our results splitting the sample between
traditional and new users.
Table 4 contains our benchmark results. The first two columns focus on the experience of
traditional users, while the last two consider the new users of AD. Furthermore, the diﬀerence
between the first and second specification of each sample is due to the inclusion of the trade
variables, which forces us to drop a large number of observations because of data availability.
In light of the results of our theoretical model, we should uncover a nonlinear eﬀect of the
political-economy weight when interacted with the use of AD measures by other countries
(on the same product and exporting country). This is what we see in all specifications with
respect to the duties introduced by new users.24 In both groups of countries, the likelihood
of an importing country introducing a new AD measure is higher whenever a new user has
introduced a similar measure in the same 4-digit HS sector, but is decreasing for high levels
of the variable , which is proxying for the political-economy motivation of the government.
While the results on the reaction to the AD actions of new users is common between the two
groups of countries, the results in columns (3) and (4) show that new users also respond to
past actions of traditional users, while traditional users do not.
As for the other regressors, the proxy variable  is statistically significant and, as ex-
pected, positive in all specifications, as sectors with higher values of  are more likely to see
24In column (4), the squared term has a p-value of 0.11.
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the introduction of AD measures. For new users, also the squared term is significant, denoting
a nonlinear eﬀect (independently of any AD measure).
Notice that the qualitative results are not aﬀected by introducing trade controls (in the
second and fourth column). Notwithstanding the large drop in observations because of data
availability, the qualitative results on the role of the political-economy channel are quite similar
(i.e., the only diﬀerence is that the interaction term between measures by new users and 2
is not significant at the conventional level for the sample of new users; it has a p-value of
011). As for the trade variables, the lagged trade share, as expected, presents a significant
and positive eﬀect in all four specifications, whereas lagged trade growth is never significant.
These results are broadly consistent with our theoretical model, but they highlight an
important diﬀerence between traditional and new users of AD. In particular, traditional users
only respond to the actions of new users, while the AD measures of both groups of countries
are statistically significant determinants of new AD measures by new-user countries.
4.3.2 Robustness Checks
The results in Table 4 show that AD measures from other users and political-economy motiva-
tions jointly aﬀect the decision to impose new AD measures in a nonlinear way, as suggested
by the theoretical model presented in Section 3. In this subsection, we discuss a series of ro-
bustness checks to demonstrate that the results presented so far are qualitatively unchanged
when using diﬀerent samples or when calculating the proxy variable  diﬀerently.
When adding trade controls, we lose a lot of observations because of lack of such data
for some years (mostly in the 1980s). However, we may also want to exclude observations
for sectors in which there is no trade. In such a case, AD measures cannot be introduced by
definition. The first two columns of Table 5 reproduce the same specifications for traditional
and new users as in Table 4 while dropping from the sample observations for which the trade
share is equal to zero at time , or  − 1, or  − 2.25 As the table makes clear, there is no
qualitative change to the results presented in the previous section. Similarly, the results are
robust to excluding those observations that are outliers in terms of trade growth, defined as
25The results are equally invariant to the exclusion of those observations for which the trade share is jointly
equal to zero in each of these three years.
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the top one percentile of the distribution (i.e., above 1,663% and 1,860% annual growth for
traditional and new users, respectively). The results for such reduced samples are reported in
the last two columns of Table 5.
In the next set of robustness checks, we eliminate the weakest AD users among the tra-
ditional and new users. The countries included in these groups are either based on historical
grounds (for traditional users) or because of the summary statistics discussed in Section 4 (for
new users). Still, the descriptive statistics reported in Table 2 indicate that not all selected
users are equally intensive in their application of AD measures. Thus, Table 6 reports the
results when excluding New Zealand from the set of traditional users and Peru, South Korea,
and Taiwan from the group of new users. As it can be seen, the results for this smaller set
of users are qualitatively identical although the interaction terms between measures of new
users and the squared term of the political-economy proxy are only significant at the 8% and
15% level in the last two columns (i.e., for new users), respectively.26
As a final robustness check, Table 7 reports the results of estimations using diﬀerent
versions of  as a proxy of political-economy motivations. Traditional users of AD have
been intensive users of this trade instrument for a long time. Thus, we now construct 
using the AD measures that they imposed over the 5-year period 1991—1995. The results
when using this version of the proxy are shown in the first two columns of Table 7. In
general, our previous results are confirmed. However, it also appears that political-economy
considerations are more prominent when proxied by the caseload of this earlier period. In
fact, the squared term of  is positive and highly significant while the linear term is not.
Finally, in the last two columns of Table 7, we use the most recent available period to
calculate  for new users.27 This exercise is particularly relevant for China since it is the
last country in our sample to have introduced an AD law (in 1997). Thus, it may be that the
government’s preferences in supporting its industries have not been completely revealed by
the period 1999—2003, which is used in the benchmark analysis (although China started using
this instrument soon after introducing the AD law). The results when using this alternative
formulation are reported in the last two columns of Table 7 and they are in line with our
26The results for new users would also be unchanged if we were to drop only the weakest AD user, Taiwan.
27In particular, we use the periods 2001—2005 for China and Taiwan, 1999—2003 for Brazil and Mexico, and
2000—2004 for the remaining countries.
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previous findings.28
5 Conclusions
This paper has documented the empirical relevance of AD echoing, whereby a given product
exported by a given country is subject to multiple ADmeasures from diﬀerent (and potentially
several) importing countries at the same time. Considering the worldwide AD caseload over
the period 1980—2005, the first result of the paper is to show that echoing is a widespread
practice that involves developed and developing countries and a variety of sectors. Thus, it is
a much more common and pervasive phenomenon than originally highlighted by Maur (1998)
for the 1980s and early 1990s in the case of Canada, the EU, and the US.
Considering its empirical relevance, we have presented a dynamic game in which two com-
peting importers can choose to impose an AD duty on a third exporting country in one
of two periods, if at all, so that we theoretically explore the determinants of AD echoing.
Consistently with the literature on trade policy in general and on AD in particular, we as-
sume that governments are politically motivated, attaching an extra weight to the profits of
their domestic import-competing industries in their objective function. The results show that
echoing is much more likely to occur when the political-economy channel is strong, but not
“too” strong. In fact, a government would introduce AD measures independently of the other
country’s actions if it cares a lot about its domestic industry. This conclusion is confirmed
when considering the AD experience of the 15 most active users of AD. Although there are
diﬀerences between traditional and new users of AD, the econometric results demonstrate
the nonlinear eﬀect of the interplay between governments’ political-economy motivations and
the AD measures introduced by other countries on the same products and against the same
exporting countries.
In conclusion, this paper highlights yet another peculiar feature of the AD system and the
strategic behaviors it can give rise to. In particular, the political-economy-driven AD actions
of diﬀerent countries are interdependent and cannot be fully understood when each importing
country is analyzed in isolation.
28The results are also qualitative similar if we change the period for the calculation of  only for China.
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 c
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 c
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 c
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 c
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.
Table 2: Summary of AD initiations and measures 
Initiations Measures 
USA 1,110 20.50% European Union 544 19.50% 
European Union 888 16.40% USA 487 17.46% 
Canada 511 9.44% Canada 302 10.82% 
Australia 452 8.35% India 301 10.79% 
India 374 6.91% Argentina 151 5.41% 
Mexico 249 4.60% Australia 143 5.13% 
South Africa 242 4.47% South Africa 134 4.80% 
Argentina 227 4.19% Mexico 129 4.62% 
Turkey 191 3.53% Turkey 127 4.55% 
Brazil 166 3.07% China 83 2.97% 
China 135 2.49% Brazil 81 2.90% 
Taiwan 128 2.36% Peru 62 2.22% 
Peru 114 2.11% South Korea 58 2.08% 
South Korea 105 1.94% New Zealand 52 1.86% 
New Zealand 104 1.92% Taiwan 31 1.11% 
Indonesia 65 1.20% Indonesia 28 1.00% 
Colombia 46 0.85% Colombia 19 0.68% 
Egypt 38 0.70% Venezuela 16 0.57% 
Thailand 31 0.57% Malaysia 5 0.18% 
Philippines 29 0.54% Philippines 5 0.18% 
Venezuela 27 0.50% Poland 5 0.18% 
Israel 26 0.48% Thailand 5 0.18% 
Malaysia 17 0.31% Egypt 4 0.14% 
Chile 14 0.26% Japan 4 0.14% 
Finland 13 0.24% Trinidad and Tobago 4 0.14% 
Poland 12 0.22% Jamaica 2 0.07% 
Trinidad Tobago 12 0.22% Ecuador 1 0.04% 
Austria 11 0.20% Finland 1 0.04% 
Sweden 11 0.20% Guatemala 1 0.04% 
Japan 10 0.18% Israel 1 0.04% 
Ukraine 10 0.18% Latvia 1 0.04% 
Latvia 7 0.13% Lithuania 1 0.04% 
Lithuania 7 0.13% Norway 1 0.04% 
Costa Rica 6 0.11% Pakistan 1 0.04% 
Uruguay 6 0.11% 
   Czech Republic 3 0.06% 
   Jamaica 3 0.06% 
   Pakistan 3 0.06% 
   Nicaragua 2 0.04% 
   Panama 2 0.04% 
   Singapore 2 0.04% 
   Bulgaria 1 0.02% 
   Ecuador 1 0.02% 
   Guatemala 1 0.02% 
   Norway 1 0.02% 
   Paraguay 1 0.02% 
   Slovenia 1 0.02%       
  5,415 100.00%   2,790 100.00% 
Notes: countries in italics are included in the econometric analysis (as importers). 
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Table 4: Benchmark results 
 Traditional users New users 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
θi,s 0.010
***
 0.016
***
 0.008
***
 0.013
***
 
 (0.002) (0.004) (0.001) (0.002) 
θi,s
2 
0.003 0.000 -0.010
***
 -0.015
***
 
 (0.003) (0.005) (0.002) (0.003) 
Trade sharei,j,k,t-2  0.003
***
  0.003
***
 
  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Trade growthi,j,k,t-2  0.000  -0.000 
  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Measure by traditional usersi,k,t/t-4 0.003
***
 0.002 0.001 0.001 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Measure by traditional usersi,k,t/t-4 X θi,s 0.077 0.094
***
 0.081
***
 0.104
***
 
 (0.040) (0.032) (0.029) (0.038) 
Measure by traditional usersi,k,t/t-4 X θi,s
2
 0.022 -0.013 -0.123
**
 -0.153
**
 
 (0.058) (0.047) (0.048) (0.065) 
Measure by new usersi,k,t/t-4 0.001
***
 0.002
***
 0.002
***
 0.002
**
 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Measure by new usersi,k,t/t-4 X θi,s 0.090
***
 0.088
***
 0.093
***
 0.103
***
 
 (0.029) (0.029) (0.029) (0.037) 
Measure by new usersi,k,t/t-4 X θi,s
2
 -0.139
***
 -0.142
***
 -0.086
**
 -0.088 
 (0.040) (0.040) (0.044) (0.055) 
Importer X exporter X year effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
HS2 effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 3,332,672 1,767,940 5,147,961 2,977,760 
R
2
 0.010 0.013 0.036 0.039 
Notes: The dependent variable takes a value of 1 if the importing country i introduces an AD measure against country j in 
the 4-digit HS sector k in year t and 0 otherwise. The table reports the estimated coefficients of a linear probability model, 
with clustered standard errors (at the importing X HS2 level) in parenthesis. ***, ** denote significance at the 1% and 5% 
level, respectively. 
  
Table 5: Robustness checks – excluding observations without trade or with outliers (in terms of 
trade) 
 Excluding observations 
without trade 
Excluding outliers 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
θi,s 0.027
***
 0.032
***
 0.016
***
 0.013
***
 
 (0.009) (0.005) (0.004) (0.002) 
θi,s
2 
-0.005 -0.034
***
 0.000 -0.015
***
 
 (0.012) (0.008) (0.005) (0.003) 
Trade sharei,j,k,t-2 0.002
***
 0.003
***
 0.003
***
 0.003
***
 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Trade growthi,j,k,t-2 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Measure by traditional usersi,k,t/t-4 0.003
**
 0.002 0.002 0.001 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Measure by traditional usersi,k,t/t-4 X θi,s 0.082
***
 0.106
**
 0.100
***
 0.106
***
 
 (0.026) (0.048) (0.032) (0.039) 
Measure by traditional usersi,k,t/t-4 X θi,s
2
 0.003 -0.185
**
 -0.025 -0.158
**
 
 (0.038) (0.073) (0.047) (0.065) 
Measure by new usersi,k,t/t-4 0.002
***
 0.002
**
 0.002
***
 0.002
***
 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Measure by new usersi,k,t/t-4 X θi,s 0.081
**
 0.116
**
 0.089
***
 0.103
***
 
 (0.036) (0.046) (0.032) (0.039) 
Measure by new usersi,k,t/t-4 X θi,s
2
 -0.141
***
 -0.109 -0.151
***
 -0.087 
 (0.049) (0.069) (0.044) (0.057) 
Importer X exporter X year effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
HS2 effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 727,344 812,996 1,735,759 2,922,981 
R
2
 0.015 0.051 0.013 0.036 
Notes: The dependent variable takes a value of 1 if the importing country i introduces an AD measure against country j in 
the 4-digit HS sector k in year t and 0 otherwise. The table reports the estimated coefficients of a linear probability model, 
with clustered standard errors (at the importing X HS2 level) in parenthesis. ***, ** denote significance at the 1% and 5% 
level, respectively. 
  
Table 6: Robustness checks – excluding weakest AD users 
 Traditional users, 
excluding New Zealand 
New users, excluding 
Peru, South Korea, Taiwan 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
θi,s 0.010
***
 0.017
***
 0.009
***
 0.013
***
 
 (0.003) (0.004) (0.001) (0.002) 
θi,s
2 
0.004 -0.002 -0.010
***
 -0.016
***
 
 (0.003) (0.005) (0.002) (0.003) 
Trade sharei,j,k,t-2  0.003
***
  0.004
***
 
  (0.001)  (0.001) 
Trade growthi,j,k,t-2  0.000  -0.000 
  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Measure by traditional usersi,k,t/t-4 0.004
***
 0.004
**
 0.001 0.001 
 (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) 
Measure by traditional usersi,k,t/t-4 X θi,s 0.067 0.085
**
 0.087
***
 0.115
***
 
 (0.043) (0.036) (0.033) (0.043) 
Measure by traditional usersi,k,t/t-4 X θi,s
2
 0.035 -0.001 -0.138
**
 -0.175
**
 
 (0.061) (0.050) (0.054) (0.071) 
Measure by new usersi,k,t/t-4 0.002
***
 0.002
***
 0.003
***
 0.002
**
 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Measure by new usersi,k,t/t-4 X θi,s 0.085
***
 0.082
***
 0.090
***
 0.102
**
 
 (0.029) (0.029) (0.032) (0.041) 
Measure by new usersi,k,t/t-4 X θi,s
2
 -0.132
***
 -0.134
***
 -0.083 -0.087 
 (0.040) (0.040) (0.048) (0.060) 
Importer X exporter X year effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
HS2 effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 2,625,448 1,400,776 3,329,039 2,116,190 
R
2
 0.010 0.013 0.038 0.042 
Notes: The dependent variable takes a value of 1 if the importing country i introduces an AD measure against country j in 
the 4-digit HS sector k in year t and 0 otherwise. The table reports the estimated coefficients of a linear probability model, 
with clustered standard errors (at the importing X HS2 level) in parenthesis. ***, ** denote significance at the 1% and 5% 
level, respectively. 
  
Table 7: Robustness checks – different time frames for political-economy proxy 
 Traditional users, θi,s from 
1991-1995 
New users, θi,s from most 
recent 5-year periods 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
θi,s -0.002 -0.002 0.007
***
 0.011
***
 
 (0.002) (0.003) (0.001) (0.001) 
θi,s
2 
0.045
***
 0.054
***
 -0.007
***
 -0.011
***
 
 (0.008) (0.011) (0.002) (0.002) 
Trade sharei,j,k,t-2  0.003
***
  0.003
***
 
  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Trade growthi,j,k,t-2  0.000  -0.000 
  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Measure by traditional usersi,k,t/t-4 0.003
***
 0.003
**
 0.001 0.001 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Measure by traditional usersi,k,t/t-4 X θi,s 0.020 0.041 0.095
***
 0.120
***
 
 (0.057) (0.068) (0.031) (0.041) 
Measure by traditional usersi,k,t/t-4 X θi,s
2
 0.301
**
 0.222 -0.138
***
 -0.169
***
 
 (0.135) (0.159) (0.044) (0.058) 
Measure by new usersi,k,t/t-4 0.001
***
 0.001
***
 0.001
***
 0.001 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Measure by new usersi,k,t/t-4 X θi,s 0.071
***
 0.074
***
 0.116
***
 0.128
***
 
 (0.019) (0.019) (0.027) (0.034) 
Measure by new usersi,k,t/t-4 X θi,s
2
 -0.175
***
 -0.203
***
 -0.110
***
 -0.114
***
 
 (0.052) (0.053) (0.034) (0.044) 
Importer X exporter X year effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
HS2 effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 3,332,672 1,767,940 5,147,961 2,977,760 
R
2
 0.010 0.013 0.036 0.039 
Notes: The dependent variable takes a value of 1 if the importing country i introduces an AD measure against country j in 
the 4-digit HS sector k in year t and 0 otherwise. The table reports the estimated coefficients of a linear probability model, 
with clustered standard errors (at the importing X HS2 level) in parenthesis. ***, ** denote significance at the 1% and 5% 
level, respectively. 
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Figure 3: Days between impositions of AD measures in echoing cases 
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Table A: Sample and sources for antidumping data 
Country Sample Source 
Argentina 1991 - 2004 B + MZ 
Australia 1989 - 2004 B + MZ 
Austria 1980 - 1995 MZ 
Brazil 1988 - 2003 B 
Bulgaria 1995 - 2003 B 
Canada 1980 - 2005 B + MZ 
Chile 1995 - 2003 B 
China 1997 - 2005 B 
Colombia 1991 - 2004 B 
Costa Rica 1996 - 2003 B 
Czech Republic 1997 - 2003 B 
Ecuador 1995 - 2003 B 
Egypt 1997 - 2003 B 
European Union 1980 - 2005 B + MZ 
Finland 1980 - 1995 MZ 
Guatemala 1996 - 2003 B 
India 1992 - 2004 B 
Indonesia 1996 - 2004 B 
Israel 1995 - 2003 B 
Jamaica 1995 - 2003 B 
Japan 1982 - 2004 B 
Latvia 2000 - 2003 B 
Lithuania 1998 - 2003 B 
Malaysia 1995 - 2003 B 
Mexico 1987 - 2003 B 
New Zealand 1982 - 2004 B + MZ 
Nicaragua 1995 - 2003 B 
Norway 1980 - 2003 MZ 
Pakistan 1995 - 2003 B 
Panama 1996 - 2003 B 
Paraguay 1996 - 2003 B 
Peru 1992 - 2004 B 
Philippines 1993 - 2003 B + MZ 
Poland 1997 - 2003 B 
Singapore 1985 - 2003 MZ 
Slovenia 1995 - 2003 B 
South Africa 1992 - 2004 B 
South Korea 1986 - 2004 B 
Sweden 1980 - 1995 MZ 
Taiwan 1983 - 2005 B 
Thailand 1995 - 2003 B 
Trinidad and Tobago 1995 - 2003 B 
Turkey 1989 - 2005 B + MZ 
Ukraine 1999 - 2004 MZ 
Uruguay 1995 - 2003 B 
USA 1980 - 2005 B 
Venezuela 1992 - 2004 B 
Notes: B stands for Bown (2007) and MZ stands for Moore 
and Zanardi (2009) 
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